ABSTRACT
The personnel turnover of the formal governmental institutions (circulation of elites) is often seen as an explanatory variable for the change and stability of a political order (Bottomore 1993: 44) . Democratic elitists claim that liberal democracy has elitist foundations (Higley and Burton 2006) and provide evidence that consolidated democracy, differently from other types of political regimes, is related to "classic elite circulation" (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 7) .
The concern of Pareto as well as of the current scholars working on western democracies 1 seems to be a low individual turnover of elites. We can find a passage where the circulation of elites is compared with "the river flooding and breaking its banks", but this happens because of the too slow elite circulation, which causes revolutions (Pareto 1966: 250) .
The primary concern of this article, as well as of the studies on Eastern European democracies (Best and Edinger 2003; Crowther and Matonyte 2007) , however, is about the high individual turnover of parliamentary elites and its potential consequences. In order to say whether the elite turnover is high or low and what it indicates, a more precise scale of measurement is required. To measure individual turnover among parliamentary elites, I will use the benchmark based on the empirical longitudinal data from many European democracies ( Figure 1 ).
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FIGURE 1. Levels of elite circulation
Source: adapted from Best, Hausmann and Schmitt (2000: 184 -185) .
From 1990 onwards, the turnover of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian parliamentary representatives declines 2 , and each consecutive parliamentary election brings more experienced MPs. However, the general level of legislative turnover, like in other countries of Eastern Europe, 3 remains high for each election taken separately and amounts to 55.5% of newcomers for the last six terms in Estonia, 54.5% in Latvia, 4 and 52.8% on average in Lithuania. The mean number of successive mandates -another indicator for elite circulation; -rises in all three countries, however, the average of 1.6 for Estonia and Latvia and 1.7 for Lithuania is significantly lower than the western European average of 2.5 mandates (Cotta and Best 2000: 505) .
Since the table in Fig. 1 suggests that the most normal level of elite change is between 20% and 40%, it is clear that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European countries with their higher elite turnover do not fall into this category.
The main question is: How could this high turnover be explained? How long could it continue? What does it indicate? What are its causes and potential consequences?
The literature suggests that a high elite circulation indicates (1) restricted systemic changes, (2) volatile elite structures (Best, Hausmann, Schmitt 2000: 184-185) , and (3) signifies a political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65) . A high legislative turnover could be caused by (4) electoral system, (5) electoral volatility, (6) double listing of candidates, (7) frequency of elections, and (8) voluntary exits such as dissatisfaction with being a legislator, desire to retire or pursue a private career (Matland and Studlar 2004: 87) . On the side of potential consequences, a high circulation of MPs might be interpreted as (9) greater chances for a system's innovativeness Legislative turnover in post-communist Eastern Europe fluctuates at the level between 50% and 75% which is almost two times higher than in most democracies of Western Europe (Best and Edinger 2003: 6) . 4 If the parliament of 1990 with the 92.5% rate of newcomers (Dreifelds 1996: 66) is included, the average for all seven terms would be 59.9%. In case we treat absolutely all MPs elected in 1990 as newcomers, the turnover reaches the level of 61%. and flexibility in terms of policy, (10) greater opportunities in attaining elite status, and (11) the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness (Putnam 1976: 65-67 ).
LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER IN THE BALTICS
The legislative turnover indicates to what extent we observe a renewal or continuity of legislative elites and -in case of political party families -whether some party families bring more parliamentary newcomers than others. 5
Estonia
The average share of parliamentary newcomers in Estonia for the last six elections is 55.5%, i.e. slightly below the Eastern European average (57.8%) for the last four parliaments: there were 68.8% of parliamentary newcomers in the second, 54.1% in the third, 53.9% in the fourth, and 54.3% in the fifth post-communist parliaments of Eastern Europe on the average (Edinger 2010: 145) . If we look for incumbency rates, we see that only 37.3% of the Riigikogu members on average get re-elected. Surprisingly enough, the share of Estonian
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In order to maximise the comparability, the political parties of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been classified according to the scheme of Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (2006) . The founding (competitive but not multiparty) elections of 1990 are excluded from the subsequent calculations in Tables 1 to 3 since the parliamentary  elite change in 1990 by definition amounted to 100%. If one differentiates between ethnic minority and ethnic majority legislators, one finds that a higher turnover is observed among ethnic minority MPs.
The high legislative turnover in Estonia provides for a higher accessibility of the elite and its permeability by non-elites. In comparison with countries having a low legislative turnover, politicians in Estonia have better chances to acquire the elite status. High legislative turnover can be interpreted as greater chances for political system's innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy, but also as an indication of the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness and as a sign of political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65-66) .
It has been noted, that "turnover within an elite institution tends to decline as the institution ages" (Putnam 1976: 65-66) . In comparison with the first post-independence election, legislative turnover rates in Estonia declined indeed, however, they still remain high in comparison with legislative rates in western democracies. Western European countries stabilised their legislative turnover rapidly after the Second World War (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007) , however, Estonia, as well as most of Eastern Europe, twenty years after regime change continues rejecting more than half of its legislators in every election. This makes us wonder what keeps the political system together and whether the political system functions in conditions of a permanent crisis.
Lat via
From 1990 onwards, the turnover of Latvian parliamentary representatives declines, and each consecutive parliamentary election brings more experienced MPs: the share of parliamentary newcomers fell from 68% in 1993 to 58% and 52% in 1998 and 2002, respectively The link between legislative turnover and women's access to the parliament has been emphasised by Matland and Studlar (2004: 88) and Schwindt-Bayer (2005) . and Socialists/Social Democrats were newcomers, and all female legislators from the populist Labour party and Liberal Democrats were for the first time elected to the Lithuanian parliament.
SEARCHING FOR EXPLANATIONS OF HIGH LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER
The turnover of newcomers and incumbency turnover can be to some extent explained by the electoral turnout (see Tables 4 and 5 ). The highest correlation between electoral turnout and the turnover of newcomers is noted in Lithuania (for all seven legislative terms) and somewhat lower (and not significant) in Estonia and Latvia. Incumbency turnover, which is not exactly the opposite of the turnover of newcomers, could be considered a complementary perspective in studying elite circulation. The Baltic States, differently from some countries or political parties 7 , do not make any legal barriers for re-election of parliamentary incumbents; nevertheless, only less than a half of incumbents get re-elected. This is much below the incumbency levels in many Western democracies (see Matland und Studlar 2004: 93) . As Table 5 shows, parliamentary incumbency correlates negatively with electoral turnout in all Baltic countries (especially in Latvia and Lithuania).
The other possible explanations have been mentioned in the literature cited above, and I would like to check to what extent they are plausible.
Restricted systemic changes
The first turnover thesis states that restricted systemic changes, such as transformation of the electoral systems, account for a high turnover of parliamentary representatives. There were substantial changes in the electoral systems of the Baltic States in the period before 1993, indeed: in 1992 Estonia and in 1993 Latvia introduced the PR system, in 1992
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Since 1949, the Constitution of Costa Rica prevents deputies from serving two successive terms; an MP may run again for an Assembly seat after sitting out one term. Political party examples include the German Greens rotating their members of Bundestag from 1983 to 1987, the Italian Communist Party replacing most of its legislators after two or three terms, and the British Labour party in 1980s practising mandatory reselection of sitting MPs (Matland and Studlar 2004: 98-99) . Lithuania introduced a mixed electoral system (70 seats in the PR segment and 71 seats in the SMD). However, in the period since 1993 onwards, no substantial changes were observed. 8 Nevertheless, the stability of electoral systems in the Baltic States did not result in stabilisation of elite turnover and a notable decrease of parliamentary newcomers.
Volatile elite structures (supply-side volatilit y)
According to the data on Eastern European democracies by Richard Rose (2009: 51) , "of the total volatility, more than five-sixths has been due to the actions of party elites creating, abandoning, or merging parties". Among Eastern European countries in the period from 1993 to 2007, Latvia had the highest electoral volatility which was up to 100% 9 explained by the behaviour of political elites creating new parliamentary parties before each legislative election; Lithuania with its 97% was not far from Latvia; Estonia with 66 per cent was below not only the Baltic, but also the Eastern European average (Rose 2009: 52) 10 .
The seemingly chaotic behaviour of the Baltic party elites, sometimes labelled 'political tourism', has its rather clear organisational patterns. The analysis by Pettai (2010) , Pettai, Auers and Ramonaitė (2011) distinguishes six types of political parties according to their organizational behaviour and origins: (1) unchanged, (2) alliance, (3) merger, (4) post-alliance, (5) fission, and (6) brand-new. The first type refers to the situation where politicians remain affiliated with their current party. Types two, three, and four refer to different situations of party reconfiguration involving the majority of politicians from certain parties. Type five is called fission, "a collective affiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks away from an established party to form a new party", and type six is labelled a brand-new party, the strategy which "involves previously unaffiliated individuals creating a brand-new party" (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003: 79) .
Using the analytical distinctions in party behaviour, we can observe that the Estonian party elites, distinguished for their practices of party mergers, show over time an increasing trend in party loyalty which in 2011 reached 100%, meaning that no changes in party restructuring have taken place. The Latvian party elites, having a reputation for preference in creating brand-new parties, slowed down this stategy and in the 2010 election opted overwhelmingly for alliances. The Lithuanian party elites, characterised by alliances and post-alliances and the absence of mergers and fissions in the beginning of the transition period, started increasingly practising party mergers and creating brand-new parties (see Pettai, Auers, and Ramonaitė 2011: 153) . These trends allow to conclude that the Estonian elites have reached party consolidation, whereas the Lithuanian elites have clearly increased their party de-consolidation; the volatility of the Latvian party elite structure continues to remain high. A partial explanation for the behaviour of Baltic party elites is suggested by Allan 8 Some changes to report were the abolishment of a lower threshold for ethnic minority parties since 1996 in the PR segment and the introduction of plurality in the SMD segment for the 2000 election in Lithuania. On average, 60 to 72% of electoral volatility in Eastern Europe is attributed to the elite behaviour; the rest is explained by the changing preferences of voters (Rose 2009: 52) . Sikk: "The principle of modern representative democracy is largely based on the principle of electoral accountability -the parties in power have to act in line with the will of people because otherwise they will be voted out of office. However, if the stakes in politics are high but steadily declining, the power holders may be tempted to make maximum use of their time in office by pursuing unaccountable or outright corrupt policies and not care too much for the negative electoral effects resulting from it. The maximum achievable utility from one term in office can even outweigh the expected total utility of future terms" (Sikk 2006: 166) .
The Crisis
The third statement (see above) reveals that a high elite turnover signifies a political crisis. Although an increased legislative turnover might mean a simple generational change (one generation of legislators leaving and the other coming) and should not be necessarily regarded as a trigger causing a political crisis or regime change, in many cases a rising parliamentary turnover follows and accompanies a political crisis or regime change. Hence, legislative turnover may serve as a kind of 'seismometer'. This approach finds a sufficient empirical support in the data on regime changes in Germany and France: the Nazi takeover in 1933 and return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958 go together with a highly increased parliamentary turnover. Our Latvian and Lithuanian data on the First Republic confirm the crisis/regime change thesis as well: parliamentary democracy in Latvia and Lithuania ends up with the Seimas or Saeima in which the number of newcomers rises after the gradual decline in previous legislatures. Parliaments of both Latvia and Lithuania serve as good predictors of the regime change: the increased numbers of newcomers finish their activities with a coup d'état in 1934 and 1926, respectively, signifying the replacement of democratic regimes with authoritarian ones in the Baltic States.
The data on Estonian parliaments, however, do not support the proposed hypothesis: the last Riigikogu before the coup d'état in 1934 has 26.1% of parliamentary newcomers, which is the lowest legislative turnover rate of all Estonian parliaments in the First Republic ever. In other words, it does not predict a switch from democracy to authoritarianism in Estonia. A partial explanation could be that the regime change in Estonia, differently from Lithuania and Latvia, was introduced by constitutional means (Taagepera 1974: 408) : in October 1933, 72.7% of voters participating in the referendum voted for the new constitution transforming the head of the state from a servant of parliament into a powerful and independent executive having the right to issue laws by decree (Raun 2001: 117) . It was a pre-emptive authoritarianism that "did not result from a direct take-over by rightist forces" (Parming 1975: 5) . The Estonian authoritarianism was mild not only in the Baltic but also in the European context of that time (Raun 2001: 122; Raun 1997: 340) . What strikes in the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian data is the relatively normal level of parliamentary elite circulation in the First Republic in comparison with the generally high level of circulation in the Second Republic: the level between 30 and 40% fits into the normal pattern of most Western European democracies after 1945 and would be desirable for the regimes of the Baltic States after 1990. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States produce almost 60% of new parliamentary representatives on average. Since "high turnover is associated with periods of crisis, while low turnover is associated with institutional stability and political tranquillity" (Putnam 1976: 65) , we arrive at a valid question: are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European countries, in the state of a permanent crisis? If yes, which mechanism then keeps the state and society together? This is not an exceptionally Baltic phenomenon: "paradoxical configurations like regime stability without elite consolidation" (Best 2007: 24) perfectly fit the patterns of developments among Eastern European parliamentary elites. Still, a satisfactory explanation is to be found.
Electoral system: SMD vs PR
The fourth thesis explains a high legislative turnover by the type of electoral system. The literature suggests that turnover in majoritarian systems is lower than in a proportional representation (Matland and Studlar 2004: 107) . Our Baltic data do not allow for a crosscountry comparison because both Estonia and Latvia have PR systems and Lithuania conducts its parliamentary elections in a mixed system. Hence, the PR and SMD segments can be compared only in the case of Lithuania. Although the differences between results in the PR and SMD segments are negligible, the Lithuanian data clearly show that in many (four out of six) cases the legislative turnover is higher in the PR segment. This suggests that SMD provides for a lower legislative turnover.
Electoral volatilit y
The fifth thesis attributes the high legislative turnover to a high electoral volatility, meaning that voters change their preferences radically from election to election.
The figures on electoral volatility in the Baltic countries differ depending on the sources and method of calculation 11 (Tables 9); however, it is obvious from all three sources that Estonia has the lowest electoral volatility and that Latvia and Lithuania have the most similar levels of electoral volatility. Table 10 and Annex Tables 1, 2 , and 3.
To continue the further analysis with our own data, one can conclude that electoral volatility accounts for the half of parliamentary newcomers (the total average of 47.5% in Lithuania, the results for Latvia and Estonia being 40.8 and 33.1%, respectively). This means that a high legislative turnover in the Baltic States by 52.5% to 66.9% is caused by other factors than electoral volatility. Estonia has the highest legislative turnover, even though its electoral volatility is the lowest among the Baltic States. 1990-1992 1992-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2011 Volatility 49 63.4 28.7 22.9 22.9 11.9
Latvia 1990-1993 1993-1995 1995-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 Firstly, calculations by Rose, Kreuzer, and Pettai are based on the political parties, whereas the figures by Kuklys rely upon political party families. Secondly, the number of legislative terms covered is different in all three sources. Thirdly, Rose refuses to divide his percentages by two, which is rather a standard (see Bartolini and Mair 1990) in volatility calculation.
D ouble listing of candidates
The Latvian and Lithuanian electoral systems allow a double listing of candidates: Latvian candidates may run in all five constituencies simultaneously, Lithuanian candidates may be placed on the nation-wide party list in a multi-member district and run in a single member district at the same time. The opportunities for double listing are worst in Estonia: there, nominated candidates, on the contrary, are allowed to run in one electoral district only; however, some candidates put on the nation-wide list have a chance to get elected in the third round of election. Following this logic, the legislative turnover should be lower in Estonia than in the other two Baltic countries; however, Estonia has the highest legislative turnover of all three Baltic States.
Frequenc y of elections
Parliamentary elections in the Baltic States are held every four years. 12 Since 1993, Estonia and Latvia had one premature election (in 1995) 13 , and Lithuania so far held elections regularly every four years. If we distribute legislative turnover not per term but per year, the annual legislative turnover in Lithuania would be 13.2%, in Estonia 15% and in Latvia 17.3%.
Greater oppor tunities for attaining elite status
A higher legislative turnover provides greater opportunities in attaining the elite status and thus better prospects for democracy (see Somit et al. 1994 ). Paradoxically, a high turnover was seen as politically stabilising not only by Marvick (1968) , but also by Pareto and Mosca who "believed that, within limits, high turnover prevents the build-up of frustration among potential challengers of the regime by allowing them to be co-opted, however briefly, into positions of leadership" (Putnam 1976: 67) .
The elite status thesis, with a modifying inclusion of gender perspective, is confirmed by the Baltic data: the highest numbers of female legislators in Latvia and Lithuania have been brought by the parties with the highest numbers of legislative newcomers (Kuklys 2008: 45) .
The lower average level of elite experience, exper tise, and effectiveness
This explanation connects a high legislative turnover with the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness. Our data do not provide with measurements of expertise and effectiveness 14 of MPs; however, if we take the mean number of elections as a proxy for legislative experience, we can observe a relationship between legislative turnover and elite experience. The Baltic data, indeed, confirm that, except for Estonia in 1995 and Latvia in 1998, the high legislative turnover goes together with the low level of parliamentary experience (mean number of elections at which MPs stood successfully).
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In Lithuania since 1992, in Estonia since 1995 and in Latvia since 1998.
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The second premature parliamentary election took place in Latvia in 2011; however, these data are not included in our analysis. 14 A possible proxy for the legislative effectiveness could be the percentage of passed laws of the total number of law drafts proposed by an MP; however, we have this type of data only for Lithuania. 
Turnover among ethnic minorities
If one compares the shares of newcomers among ethnic minority and MPs belonging to the titular nation, implications for stability are more visible among ethnic minority representatives in Latvia: in four out of six Latvian Saeimas, the share of newcomers among ethnic majority legislators has been higher than among ethnic minority MPs. In Estonia, we observe the opposite trend: in five out of six Riigikogu, the share of newcomers is higher among ethnic minority than ethnic majority MPs. The Lithuanian data show a situation in-between: in a half (three of six) of parliaments, a higher legislative turnover is found among ethnic Lithuanian legislators. This evidence allows to conclude that the longer the period of regime discontinuity (length of the non-democratic regime), the longer it will take to stabilise the parliamentary turnover in the new democracy. 15 15 Cotta and Verzichelli (2007: 471) argue that "the crucial factor is probably the quality of discontinuity more than its length". For the Baltic countries, this would mean a more precise differentiation among authoritarian regimes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania before the Soviet occupation in 1940.
Path dependence

CONCLUSIONS
Out of a variety of explanations, the path dependence and the supply-side volatility seem to provide the most convincing explanations for the high turnover among Baltic legislators. This means that the long previous period of a non-democratic regime will keep the legislative turnover in new Baltic democracies at a relatively high level for some time till they reach the 'western' levels of parliamentary turnover 16 , and the volatile elite structures (party elites switching, abandoning, and creating new political parties) will continue contributing to the high legislative turnover as well.
On the other hand, it may be that the Baltic states, which are no exception from Eastern Europe in terms of legislative turnover, provide the established democracies of Western Europe with a perspective of their near future: "Insofar, Eastern and Central Europe provides the West with an image of its own future, including the corrupting consequences of political career insecurity, such as tendency towards to a 'grab and run' mentality" (Best 2007: 30-31 
